IPTMan Delegate Platform

Delegate Name: IPTMan
Delegate Address: 0x5fee8d7d02B0cfC08f0205ffd6d6B41877c86558 (IPTMan.eth)
Forum Handle: IPTMan
Email: iptman7@gmail.com
Discord: IPTMan.eth

Delegate Platform or Philosophy:

Core Values

  • Stakeholder Recognition - Protocol/Delegate actions should take into account affects on all stakeholders. IPT holders, vault owners, and USDi holders. There is a firm belief in making compromises that seek to achive WIN-WIN-WIN for all stakeholders and worst case avoids a LOSE scenario for any of them.
  • Secure, Sustainable and Scalable Systems.
  • Importance of Data Analytics to Goal achievement and problem solving.
  • Transparency - A dedication to carrying out activities as transparently as possible.
    Delegation Statement

Service to Interest Protocol involves the following commitments:

  • In good and bad economic times, look out for all the important IP work-economic stakeholders (IPT holders, vault owners, USDi holders and users, InterestProtocol DAO, and DeFI in general).
  • To looking at the IP system from both the internal microcosms of contracts, people, operations, to the greater macrocosms of DeFI and the real world in terms of fair, equitable and transparent governance, law and finance.
  • To creating Safe, Scalable, and Sustainable Systems as Simply and Efficiently as possible.
  • To growing IP and USDi in a way that is Sustainable for the long term.
  • To use Data Driven Analytics to drive decision-making and measure goal achievement. Look towards the future by analyzing the past and present.

History and experience I bring to IP

Multiple years of DAO participation in Maker (retired MakerDAO delegate but still active in forums, discord), 1Hive, and personal experience across a number of ecosystems and DAO communities from Ethereum, to Gnosis, Polygon, Celo, Optimism, Arbitrum, etc. Strong scientific educational background that focuses on a measurement approach to problem identification and application of solutions. In all my DAO actions I seek to bring forward issues with proposals for discussion seeking community consensus before acting.

Conflicts of interest

While I am active in many communities it is my general approach to conflicts of interest to first.

  • Declare those publicly. (be Transparent about conflicts of interest)
  • Abstain from votes where conflicts of interest exist.
  • If necessary re-delegate my voting power to another less or non-conflicted individual/delegate.

First edited 20221012_0347UTC
Last edited 20221012_0347UTC

3 Likes

Please indicate your monthly activity on your delegate post here.

Here are the requirements for compensation.

Compensation Eligibility:

  • Communicate on the IP forum how and why a delegate voted the way they did within seven days of the close of a vote (minimum 90% of the time) in their dedicated delegate thread.
  • Command voting weight greater than or equal to 1 basis point of the total IPT supply;
  • Participate in at least 90% of all on-chain IP votes within the previous 90 days
  • The Recognized Delegate (or one authorized representative if a team or institution) must attend at least one public protocol development call each month
1 Like

20220107_1733 UTC IPTMan Delegate communication.

NOTE: I will figure out how I want to format these and I may be beyond the 7 days on IPT proposal 15 but I have been meaning to get something up on IP prop 15.

Regarding IPT governance proposal 15

This proposal changed rewards from a 2/3 to 1/3 split for USDI borrowers:Uniswap v2 ETH/USDI liquidity to more like a 44:55 split for USDI borrowers:USDI holders eliminating ETH/USDI v2 liquidity (only because there isn’t 100K there currently). This was to attempt to reward those holding USDi and try to bring more USDC into the protocol.

I believe that using IPT token to reward liquidity IS useful but honestly rewards should be connected to liquidity NOT a fixed decaying amount. You would think markets would take advantage of 40-50-100% APRs but the competition for these kinds of rewards and the rates are just too high. I’d prefer to conserve IPT and target some kind of liquidity reward rate in the 10-20% APR range based on avg IPT price during the week. I also believe that if IP is going to push out IPT rewards it should also incentivize IPT:USDI or IPT:USDC liquidity as giving a market to IPT is just as important as liquidity for USDI.

I did not oppose this governance proposal for a few reasons:

  1. I personally benefit from this change due to my own positions.
  2. The change doesn’t really change rewards that much.
  3. As an experiment we could see if there was any real change.

While this looked to moderately succeed the last I looked deposit rates were running almost 30% and borrow rates around 40%. I ended up having to deposit some USDC just to bring rates down to the 4% deposit and 7.5% borrow.

The inherent problem here is liquidity management. There is no USDC that the protocol can use to buffer rates, and the rate curve model while useful, doesn’t really take into account the size of the liquidity base against the borrow. We’d have the same kind of curve if there was $100 USDC vs $10M USDC the curve is a feature designed to bring in and exit liquidity on the ends of the rate curve but doesn’t really do that well incentivizing liquidity nor managing rates when the protocol is small (<$1M USDI is small).

As I have been working on my own grander model I have come up with much better ways to deal with the initial bootstrapping of liquidity and this really involves having some amount of liquidity outside of the liquidity system which can be used to manage system liquidity and rates.

The concept for IP would be to set aside some of the USDC raised in the initial sale and use it within the protocol to achieve a target borrowing and deposit rate, kind of like the D3M in Maker. Set a target rate and allow the USDC to move into an out of the protocol to take advantage of returns.

There are benefits and drawbacks to this model.

Drawbacks

  1. Need USDC liquidity base.
  2. The management of rates is limited by the size of the liquidity base.
  3. Transactions to enter/exit USDC/USDI are costly so this won’t be fine grained.
  4. At some point the amount of USDC required to manage rates this way will be outstripped by market demand (rates eventually will fluctuate, BUT they can still be buffered to some extent by this USDC liquidity pool).

Benefits

  1. A liquidity managed rate gives borrowers some stability (not guaranteed) but then rates won’t be fluctuating so much.
  2. More dependable borrow and deposit rates.
  3. The USDC generated by initial raise could earn some return growing the USDC in the protocol. (i.e. use the protocol to earn return on cash).

It is my hope to change this rewards model to something that makes more sense generally and has long term sustainability.

2 Likes

thank you activity noted

@IPTMan can you confirm if you have attended the monthly meeting? Also that you meet the eligibility to be a recognized delegate.
See here: Proposal:IP Recognized Delegates Program - #17 by mastermojo

1 Like

Assumption on ‘meeting attendance’ would be that someone else would take roll-call and post. Me saying I attended probably isn’t the most secure way of verifying this. @PaperImperium and others know I was there at the January meeting.

As to eligibility to be a recognized delegate. I have a significant delegated position (now listed at 1.47M). As to noting proposal support given the nature of how optimistic governance works we only are voting if we don’t support a proposal. This idea that I am going to have to write up why I support everything to me is more about why I don’t oppose it.

I have stated elsewhere that I think the whole nature of optimistic proposals is that there is no distinction between a yes and an abstain vote and putting this information in delegate platforms vs. forum proposal threds or burying it in delegate platforms probably not ‘optimistic’ approach to tracking proposal sentiment and ‘voting’. Delegates can just link to comments in those threads. I will try to follow the above with mine.

BTW: When it comes to collateral additions unless I am really against them I usually don’t have much to say. My biggest concern is that collateral is being added to satisfy people’s personal preferences. I tended to avoid this (as I would be pushing for Uni v2 ETH-USDC btw since I would use that to back my collateral borrows vs. other things). I consider the LP and interesting earning types to be better collateral than straight up non-earning tokens since they should increase in value against a flat $$ borrow than any other collateral. MATIC, UNI, ETH.

20230131_1800UTC IPTMan Delegate communication.

IPT governance proposal 16

First I want to make some general comments regarding how ideas are handled. Example here is that again multiple ‘proposals’ are being bundled. There is no single discussion thread regarding IPIP 16. But there are two different discussion threads regarding changing the UNI LTV and adding ZRX.

I personally like clean delineations between:

  1. when something is being discussed (proposal RFC - where a proposed idea details are put forward and the community refines any details) and
  2. When the proposal is a formal IPIP with a number and RFC is effectively closed for discussion.

My point here is that to look at discussion for IPIP 16 I need to scan two different threads. I am decidedly against merging of proposals because I don’t like the idea of stopping 5 things because I disagree with one of them.

My other point is a suggestion for vote/sentiment tracking.

Once a formal IPIP proposal is up for vote there should be a IPIP Number with title proposal forum thread put up. Delegates and anyone else voting should voice support, abstain, rejection in that thread. Delegates can link to their comments in the threads to confirm governance participation meeting participation metrics. This suggestion solves two problems.

  1. A single unified place and way to search on actual proposals and vote + vote sentiment
  2. (1) above is the unified place for Delegates to complete participation eligibility requirements.
  3. Delegates can then link to their vote comments in IPIP proposal threads so anyone tracking delegates can easily look at delegate threads for links to IPIP proposal votes for information.

The above clarifies a number of communication issues around IPIP proposals formally in governance to to be/being voted on, vs. proposal RFC and simplifies how to find things in the forum. When I look for IPIP 16 in the forum threads - nothing comes up. Yet i can look up adding ZRX and changing the LTV on UNI and have two different threads. Where exactly is the place to post my vote sentiment. If delegates do this individually in their delegate threads there will be no easy way to gather voting information.

Regarding IPIP 16 proposal formally in governance

The ZRX token is the governance token of the 0x Protocol. It was one of the first [DEX governance tokens ever deployed (2017)](javascript:void(0)).

The proposed parameters and cap are set conservatively given relative low DEX liquidity. To be revisited if liquidity increases.

$250K cap
50% LTV
Liquidation fee(incentive) 15%
oracle ZRX/ETH

Hard for me to see with 50% LTV and 15% liquidation fee that people would use this collateral and the 250K cap won’t do much for the protocol. Straight out of the gate at Maker I was decidedly against willy nilly adding small collateral because I felt it was a waste of time. I was overruled at the time and later due to high on-chain oracle costs Maker realized it needed to remove these. Unclear to me that the ROI for the work/cost to keep this in the protocol will actually be worth it.

I am for looking at entire market and adding large cap collaterals. I am against Delegates or whomever trying to add their pet low liquidity collaterals (because no-one would oppose them).

Regarding changing the LTV to 70% on UNI.

I think UNI is a better addition to IP, it has a higher market cap and trading. I had started a review on the LTV, liquidation fees, and caps of collateral types on IP and felt that normalizing the liquidation fees to the LTV and managing exposure by controlling cap was more useful approach. Having provisional collateral setups useful, but once these are formally added and pass the provisional period I would like to see a more ‘standardized’ approach to criterion for collaterals to add, and Liquidation Fees against LTV against cap done.

I will make a forum thread at some point and post my notes and thinking on this. The real goal here is to find collateral that people really want to borrow with that has significant cap, robust trading, that needs to be served.

I think the real issue for IP is why should someone bring collateral to IP vs. Compound, AAVE, Maker, etc. We need to think about what IP can bring to the table here that can increase our growth and this may require taking some risk and thinking outside of the box to get from 1M USDi to 10 or 100M USDi.

End result here.

While I can’t say I support addition of ZRX, with the cap low and conservative terms I see no real reason to oppose it. The LTV change on UNI I already had as a target in my own models (hence I support this) which I will post in the next week or so regarding normalzing fees/LTV and using caps as the risk management.

2 Likes

Really appreciate the detailed post IPTMan! Can you elaborate a bit more on the cost to setting up on-chain oracles? I know Uniswap oracles are free to use but I have no idea the associated costs to setting up Chainlink oracles and what the ongoing maintenance fees are.

I’ve been wanting to dig into this topic for a while but haven’t found any detailed resources online.