This proposal seeks to amend the current on-chain participation eligibility for compensation, within the recognized delegate program, from 90 days to 30 days, with the new requirement being 'participate in at least 90% of all on-chain IP votes within the previous 30 days.
The purpose of this adjustment is to encourage greater engagement and offer rewards to new recognized delegates who meet the other eligibility criteria. The recognized delegate program was established to facilitate the maximum potential growth of IP by providing a pathway to decentralized ownership and granting protocol control to a large group of thoughtful and intelligent participants. However, the current 90-day period limits incentive and retention for newly engaged delegates.
Current Compensation Eligibility:
Communicate on the IP forum how and why a delegate voted the way they did within seven days of the close of a vote (minimum 90% of the time) in their dedicated delegate thread.
Command voting weight greater than or equal to 1 basis point of the total IPT supply;
Participate in at least 90% of all on-chain IP votes within the previous 90 days
The Recognized Delegate (or one authorized representative if a team or institution) must attend at least one public protocol development call each month.
Amended Compensation Eligibility:
Communicate on the IP forum how and why a delegate voted the way they did within seven days of the close of a vote (minimum 90% of the time) in their dedicated delegate thread.
Command voting weight greater than or equal to 1 basis point of the total IPT supply;
Participate in at least 90% of all on-chain IP votes within the previous 30 days
The Recognized Delegate (or one authorized representative if a team or institution) must attend at least one public protocol development call each month.
The proposal would need to pass to limit the on-chain voting eligibility (as a reminder it is based on on-chain voting, so your wallet address that tokens should be delegated to would need to be indicated on your delegate page. There are also other eligibilities in order to receive compensation (please see above). I just recognized that the 90-day time period was limited, so proposing to shorten the days (everything else still remains the same).
It would be interesting to see how other fellow delegates become active with this proposal, perhaps not many participate because of how âfar awayâ the incentive seems to them.
If 30 vs. 90 days affects retention of delegates then I am not sure I want them even so I think we can make a concrete change that incorporates the above as well as something important to me rewarding in direct proportion to activity.
I have been looking at the ve(3,3) model and wondering why all compensation doesnât drip out of a vesting contract honestly. Given the low IPT price If people are just going to swap their IPT for USDC it makes more sense to get people to have some skin in here rather than to just claim rewards and cash them out.
The other issue is this Amendment doesnât really take into account any possibility of âvacationâ, âsickâ, or other personal reasons someone may miss a vote also when it comes to 90% of 3 votes - miss one and you basically are out of compensation for the month which doesnât seem fair (or is only fair in the first couple months - think of this like being on probation in a job).
With the above in mind:
So if there were changes to Compensation Eligibility to change.
Reward delegate participation directly as follows:
There are two 1hr calls/month (Ct=total calls in particular governance month), Ca = calls a delegate attended
Votes cost <$10 to execute on-chain usually and maybe take 10minutes to execute perhaps an our or more to consider. (Vt= total votes in a particular governance month), Va = Votes attended
Calculate two participation percentages
a) monthly - there are total Ct calls and Vt votes. Value these equally and allow people to miss up to 1 of these. Calculate Monthly Attendance percentage Ma = i/(Ct+Vt-1) i = Ct + Vt + Cp(see suggestion below). (Yes Ma can be > 100% with Ma = (Vt+Ct+Cp)/(Ct+Vt-1))
b) Previous 12 months (yearly or historical participation) Ya = Average (Ma) over past 12 months (or entire participation if less than 12 months).
c) if Ma >= Ya then Pa=Ma else Pa=Ya. If Pa > 100% set Pa for calculation of the IPT payout in (4) below to be 100%.
Monthly IPT compensation by participation is Mca = Total IPT earnable (calculated as normal based on voting power) * Pa
Reasoning on above.
Calculating participation based on activity in actionable community events with equal value isnât unreasonable (I valued voting actions and call participation at $50/ea which is pretty good reward for most people)
Allowing people to miss 1 event per month and allowing the Mp calculation to exceed 100% for the Yp calculation allows people to âbankâ participation over 12 months so they wonât lose compensation if they have a bad participation month (unless it was the first one)
Longer term participation is rewarded, early on lack of participation effectively punished.
Using a 12 month running average means accumulated participation drops off after 12 months.
The calculations are such that compensation is related to participation and basically brackets 100% of the normal IPT compensation (based on voting power) and 0%.
The above change actually includes the 30 day change suggested in original post.
Last point for governance to think about:
is that I think at least 1/2 of ALL the IPT rewards/compensation should have either a vesting period (say 12 months) or drip out of a reward contract to simulate a kind of vest.
We can consider including in the above bonus activity points for getting proposals passed Cp = number of proposals passed in the month is added to the participation total. Whole point here is to account for participation above a minimum level so in the loosest sense we account for delegate activities above the 100% threshold and accumulate them into the Monthly participation percentages.
Governance can also think more carefully about what minimum Pa is required to get compensation on any given month or overall.
These are some interesting points, and it may take some time for people to chew on them.
For myself, I agree we donât want drive-by governance being rewarded. But at the same time, we have to be honest. This is a small protocol and even places like Uniswap or Maker really struggle to have engaged delegates. I know youâre familiar with the whole Hasu thing over at Maker, where he checked out for a long time then tried to actually come back. The issue was heâd dug such a big hole for himself he couldnât really get back to being compensated.
I think realistically we want to preserve some path for âdelegate rehabilitationâ or fairly rapid onboarding. Offering âpersonal daysâ like you suggest may be one avenue to do that. Vesting also something I think that has not been thought much about.
A community call will be scheduled for next week. We should have this on the agenda, I suppose. We need a broader base of delegates, and hopefully spread out the IPT to more people as we do it.
Agree which is why my proposed changes donât have a lower limit for compensation and on any given month you either fall back to your long term average (Ya) or rise to your best month (Ma) so if you all of a sudden have a great month, even if you had a terrible year your compensation rises immediately. This is literally instant rehabilitation in a single Month.
I think I just wanted compensation to have a participation component that basically allowed everyone with any participation to have some minimum level of compensation and to reward others with significant compensation to build that up so they donât take a hit when missing a couple votes or a call or two.
Definitely put it on agenda for call next week I will be happy to elaborate. While the math may seem complex really it is pretty simple, and the effective reward metric is:
Votes*partcipationMetric and basically skews down from the maximum level (100%) to 0 and on any given month can easily recover to 100% again.